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TIME TO RELOAD: 
STATES REQUEST MORE TIME ON THE ARMS TRADE TREATY 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 11, 2012, Turkish officials grounded a Russian plane headed 
for Syria.1 According to the Turkish Prime Minister, the plane contained arms 
and munitions bound for the Syrian government.2 President Assad’s Syrian 
regime is currently embroiled in a long civil war against an insurgency, and 
Russia remains Syria’s top arm supplier.3 Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) continue to raise awareness about illegal arms that flow into Syria 
from Russia and other states.4 They point to the Syrian conflict and several 
conflicts in Africa as reasons for why global arms regulation is a necessity.5 
The United Nations had been trying to advance such an international 
instrument for the regulation of arms for several years.6 
In 2006, the United Nations General Assembly voted on a resolution to 
draft a binding arms trade treaty that would regulate the international transfer 
of arms.7 The resolution drew overwhelming support with 153 states casting 
votes in favor of it, and only the United States casting a “no” vote.8 In October 
2009, however, the United States indicated a dramatic change in policy and 
 
 1. Ellen Barry & Rick Gladstone, Turkish Premier Says Russian Munitions Were Found on 
Syrian Jet, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/ 
world/middleeast/syria.html?_r=0. 
 2. Ian Black & Miriam Elder, Turkey Accuses Russia of Supplying Syria with Munitions, 
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/11/turkey-accuses-
russia-syria-munitions. 
 3. Louis Charbonneau, Arms Trade Treaty Negotiations Begin, Syria Casts Shadow, 
REUTERS (July 2, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/02/us-arms-treaty-IdUSBRE86 
107720120702. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See infra Part I.A–B. 
 7. G.A. Res. 61/89, ¶¶ 1–4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/89 (Dec. 6, 2006). 
 8. There were 24 abstentions including the Russian Federation, China, and Iran. See U.N. 
BIBLIOGRAPHIC. INFO. SYS., http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=G383523NL49 
00.26363&profile=voting&uri=full=3100023~!820106~!4 (follow “New Keyword Search” under 
“Voting Records;” follow “Search by: UN Resolution Symbol;” input A/RES/61/89) (last visited 
Apr. 22, 2014). 
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declared that it would support the Arms Trade Treaty (“Treaty”).9 Former 
secretary of state Hillary Clinton stated that the United States would help 
negotiate a treaty that “contains the highest possible, legally binding standards 
for the international transfer of conventional weapons.”10 In December of 
2009, the General Assembly of the United Nations agreed on a resolution to 
hold a conference in 2012 for the drafting and passage of the comprehensive 
Treaty.11 The United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, which 
met on July 2-27, 2012, had the opportunity to establish a global regulatory 
regime for both conventional weapons and small arms. As the Conference for 
the Arms Trade Treaty drew to a close, however, the United States announced 
that more time was needed to conclude the convention.12 Russia, North Korea, 
Cuba, and Venezuela agreed that the treaty was not yet satisfactory.13 Thus, in 
an October meeting the First Committee of the General Assembly, the 
Committee passed a resolution to reconvene the conference in March 2013.14 
During the March 2013 Conference, States did not pass the new draft of 
the treaty. The UN General Assembly, however, overwhelmingly approved the 
Treaty when it met in April. It will now go to the States for ratification before 
it can enter into force. 
The Treaty will continue to face barriers to both its ratification and its 
implementation.15 Groups of states that export arms had an economic interest 
in producing a weaker treaty. Meanwhile, groups that stress their own security 
and sovereignty interests also pushed against a strong treaty. Other groups of 
states, however, subscribed to the goal of imbedding human security interests 
into a very strong treaty.16 These factors, which stalled the Treaty’s passage in 
July 2012, will continue to play a role in the Treaty’s implementation. Even 
 
 9. Press Release, Hilary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Support 
for the Arms Trade Treaty (Oct. 14, 2009), available at www.state.gov/secretary/20092013 
clinton/rm/2009a/10/130573.htm. 
 10. Id. 
 11. G.A. Res. 64/48, ¶¶ 4, 6, 8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/48 (Dec. 2, 2009). 
 12. Press Statement, Victoria Nuland, Dep’t Spokesperson at the U.S. Dep’t of State, Arms 
Trade Treaty Conference (July 27, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/07/ 
195622.htm. 
 13. Mark Bromley et al., The UN Arms Trade: Arms Export Controls, the Human Security 
Agenda and the Lessons of History, 88 INT’L AFFAIRS 1029, 1029 (2012). 
 14. G.A. First Comm. 67/L.11, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/67/L.11 (Oct. 18, 2012). The First 
Committee of the General Assembly focuses on Disarmament and International Security. It is one 
of the Six Main Committees within the General Assembly. See First Committee, GAOR, 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/first/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. Most Western European states, who have already developed a humanitarian framework 
in their regional arms control regimes, are strong supporters of this framework for the ATT. See 
Human Rights, ARMSTREATY.ORG (Jan. 12, 2014), http://www.armstreaty.org/issue/human-
rights. 
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after the states concluded the Treaty in April 2013 through the United Nations 
General Assembly, the success of the treaty will largely rely on enforcement 
from the same states that desire a weaker treaty: the nations that supply the 
majority of the world’s arms. 
This article argues that the issues that plagued the negotiation of the Treaty 
in July 2012 will continue to be an issue in the implementation of the Treaty. 
But it also suggests that the 2012 draft of the Arms Trade Treaty both balanced 
the goals of the several frameworks and could effectively regulate the global 
arms trade. Part I will explain the historical roots of this Treaty and will 
examine the goals of the Treaty. The previous agreements concerning the 
international arms trade demonstrate the principles behind the methods that the 
Treaty uses. Part II will provide frameworks for analyzing the competing 
interests of states during negotiations of the Treaty. Part III will explain that 
the 2012 draft of the Arms Trade Treaty balances these interests to produce an 
agreeable treaty. 
I.  HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS LEADING TO THE ARMS TRADE TREATY 
Pre-Cold War efforts to regulate the global arms trade met with little 
success.17 Following World War I, states attempted to regulate the arms trade 
though the Convention of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition.18 The treaty 
advanced principles of licensing arms exports, publication of annual reports, 
and restrictions to “prohibited areas.”19 Because the treaty restricted trade to 
non-signatories, many states did not ratify the treaty because they did not want 
to be restricted in their arms sales or purchases.20 Thus, the treaty never came 
into force.21 In 1925, a subsequent treaty negotiated in Geneva did not come 
into force because states that relied on imports for their arms raised concerns 
about sovereignty and their ability to obtain arms.22 
Due to the bipolar hostilities of the Cold War, most pre-1990 arms control 
measures focused on state security interests.23 The United States and its allies 
established the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control to 
prevent arms transfers to the Soviet Union and its allies,24 and the Soviet 
 
 17. See SARAH PARKER, IMPLICATIONS OF STATES’ VIEWS ON AN ARMS TRADE TREATY 2–
3 (2008), available at http://unidir.org/publications; Bromley et al., supra note 13, at 1031–33. 
 18. PARKER, supra note 17, at 2. 
 19. Id. at 3. The “prohibited areas” included “Africa and Asian parts of the Ottoman 
Empire.” Id. The idea of publication of annual exports and licensing are still dominant themes in 
the Arms Trade Treaty negotiations. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Bromley et al., supra note 13, at 1032–33. 
 23. Id. at 1034; ANNA STAVRIANAKIS, TAKING AIM AT THE ARMS TRADE: NGOS, GLOBAL 
CIVIL SOCIETY, AND THE WORLD MILITARY ORDER 51 (2010). 
 24. PARKER, supra note 17, at 3. 
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Union also restricted its allies from producing or exporting arms.25 The few 
successful agreements prior to 1990 primarily involved the dominance of arms 
supplying states at the expense of arms importing states.26 Finally, due to the 
types of weapons that the United States, Soviet Union, and their respective 
allies traded, the focus of international arms trade during the Cold War was 
large, conventional weapons.27 Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, 
then, states wishing to advance international arms regulation continued to use a 
framework dedicated to conventional arms and states’ security interests.28 The 
creation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms in 1991 
reflected many of these characteristics.29 
A. United Nations Register of Conventional Arms 
1. Original Methodology 
The United Nations General Assembly created the Register of 
Conventional Arms (Register) in 1991.30 Its goal, both then and now, was to 
increase the transparency of international arms transfers.31 Increasing 
transparency had two desired goals: first, the Register would increase 
confidence because states would be less likely to misinterpret an importing 
state’s intentions than if such transfers were secret; secondly, states would be 
more aware of those instances in which an “excessive and destabilizing 
accumulation” of arms might be taking place.32 
 
 25. Id. However, the two sides continued to exchange arms extensively with their allies. See 
Bromley, et al., supra note 13, at 1033. 
 26. Bromley et al., supra note 13, at 1031. These agreements include the Brussels Act of 
1890, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls in 1949, and the 1950 
Tripartite Declaration. Id. at 1031–34. 
 27. See Harold Hongju Koh, A World Drowning in Guns, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333, 2343 
(2003). 
 28. Bromley et al., supra note 13, 1034–35. 
 29. See G.A. Res. 46/36 L U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/36 (Dec. 6, 1991). Then UN General 
Assembly “Realizing that excessive and destabilizing arms buildups pose a threat to national, 
regional, and international peace and security . . . .” 
 30. G.A. Res. 46/36 (L), (X), U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/36 (Dec. 6, 1991). 
 31. CONVENTIONAL ARMS BRANCH OF THE U.N. OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, 
UNODA OCCASIONAL PAPERS NO. 16, APR. 2009: ASSESSING THE UNITED NATIONS REGISTER 
OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS, at 5, U.N. Sales No. E.09.IX.4 (2009); See also PAUL HOLTOM, 
TRANSPARENCY IN TRANSFERS IN SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS: REPORT ON THE UNITED 
NATIONS REGISTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS, 2003-2006, SIPRI POLICY PAPER NO. 22, 3 
(2008), available at http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=362. 
 32. UNODA OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 16, supra note 31, at 5. 
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The Register also promotes public transparency by “making information 
on a state’s preferences, intentions, and capabilities available to its citizens.”33 
Public transparency allows a state’s citizens and arms control NGOs to monitor 
a state’s compliance with its international obligations and to hold that state 
accountable for its violations of those obligations.34 The Register originally 
listed seven types of arms for which it encouraged states to report annual 
transfers: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, 
combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles or missile systems.35 
Absent from the list was a provision for small arms or light weapons despite 
their prevalent transfers throughout the Cold War.36 
2. Expanding the Register 
In 2003, however, the United Nations expanded the Register to allow states 
to submit reports on small arms and light weapons transfers.37 In 2006, the 
Register took the step of creating a standardized reporting form for these types 
of arms.38 While states recognized the benefits of transparency that the 
Register provided, they also have realized that “the scope of [the Register] 
[was] too limited”39 and did not account for the potentially devastating effects 
of small arms and light weapons.40 Many conventional arms export agreements 
concluded in the 1990s between former Cold War states focused on state 
security as their primary concern.41 
States slowly began to recognize that there were security concerns 
presented by the oversupply of small arms and light weapons.42 Meanwhile, 
NGOs and several states began stressing human security concerns in 
conventional arms control fields.43 This focus on a human security framework 
by NGOs “bridged the divide between issues of arms control and export 
 
 33. Compare the Register to the Wassenaar Agreement, which provides strictly 
intergovernmental transparency through confidential reporting at biannual meetings. HOLTOM, 
supra note 31, at 6. 
 34. HOLTOM, supra note 31, at 6. 
 35. G.A. Res. 46/36 (L), supra note 30, at Annex. 
 36. See Koh, supra note 27, at 2343–44. 
 37. PAUL HOLTOM & MARK BROMLEY, IMPLEMENTING AN ARMS TRADE TREATY: 
LESSONS ON REPORTING AND MONITORING FROM EXISTING MECHANISMS 5 (2011), available at 
http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=426; See also G.A. Res. 58/54, ¶ 2, UN Doc. 
A/RES/58/54 (Dec. 8, 2003). 
 38. HOLTOM & BROMLEY, supra note 37, at 6. 
 39. See HOLTOM & BROMLEY, supra note 37, at 5. 
 40. See Koh, supra note 27, at 2336 (linking the spread of the AK-47 to guerrilla resistant 
movements in Africa and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan). 
 41. See Bromley et al., supra note 13, at 1035. 
 42. See Koh, supra note 27, at 2343. Koh suggests that the oversupply of small arms 
contributed to the conflicts in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo. See id. 
 43. Bromley et al., supra note 13, at 1035–36. 
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control.”44 The changes to the Register in 2003 and 2006 demonstrated the 
shift in the understanding of small arms and light weapons as a global concern. 
It also exemplified the introduction of the human security framework and shift 
away from the state security framework for some states. 
3. Criticism of the Register 
The Register has received varying degrees of criticism for its 
effectiveness.45 The number of states that have consistently reported is few.46 
This lack of participation undercuts both the transparency and confidence 
building functions of the Register. Moreover, NGOs and some states have 
concerns that the register is too limited in its scope.47 The United Nations took 
thirteen years to include small arms and light weapons in the Register despite 
notice of their danger and ability to cause instability. Some scholars also 
present a concern that the Register is not flexible enough and has “failed to 
secure comprehensive participation and consistent observance.”48 Despite 
these limitations, many states support the transparency and confidence building 
aspects of the Register, and desire to incorporate a reporting mechanism into 
the Treaty.49 Understanding the criticisms and limitations of the Register will 
help states negotiating the Treaty improve the mechanism that has helped 
provide transparency in the global arms trade. 
B. Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade 
in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects 
Building on the momentum from the 1990s for controlling the transfer of 
arms using the human security framework, the United Nations convened its 
Global Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its 
Aspects in July 2001 and approved the Programme of Action (PoA).50 The 
PoA attempted to balance states’ national security concerns with emerging 
human security concerns. The preamble notes that the participating states are 
 
 44. Bromley et al., supra note 13, at 1037. 
 45. See Cristiane Carneiro, From the United Nations Arms Register to an Arms Trade 
Treaty—What Role for Delegation and Flexibility, 14 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 477, 478–81 
(2008). See HOLTOM & BROMLEY, supra note 37, at 7 for an analysis of the numbers of states 
reporting to the Register. 
 46. See HOLTOM & BROMLEY, supra note 37, at 7 (noting that only thirty-seven UN member 
states have reported for each year between 1992-2009). 
 47. Id. at 5. 
 48. Carneiro, supra note 45, at 478–79 (citing SEIMON T. WEZEMAN, THE FUTURE OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS REGISTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS 24 (2003), available at http://books.sipri. 
org/files/PP/SIPRIPP04.pdf). 
 49. HOLTOM AND BROMLEY, supra note 37, at 2. 
 50. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in All Its Aspects, July 9–20, 2001, ¶ 1, UN Doc. A/CONF.192/15 [hereinafter PoA]. 
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“Determined to reduce human suffering caused by illicit trade in small arms; 
Recognizing that illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. . .undermines 
respect for international humanitarian law; and [are] Gravely concerned about 
[the illicit trade’s] devastating consequences on children . . . women and the 
elderly . . . .”51 Measured against these goals are a series of reaffirmations 
concerning “the inherent right to individual or collective self-defense; the right 
of each State to manufacture, import, and retain small arms and light weapons 
for its self-defense and security needs; and the right of self-determination for 
all peoples . . . .”52 The PoA thus “calls on states to pursue a variety of 
national, regional, and global measures” to combat the illicit trade in small 
arms and light weapons.53 
The PoA places the most responsibility for combating illicit trade in small 
arms and light weapons at the national level.54 At the national level, the PoA 
calls on states to pass laws to effectively regulate the manufacture, export, 
import, and transit of small arms.55 States should designate a national “point of 
contact” to interact with other states and aid in implementing the PoA.56 
Another crucial element to the PoA is the urge for states to pass legislation 
requiring marking on all firearms in order to facilitate tracking the weapons.57 
Finally, among other suggestions, the PoA calls on states to take measures to 
secure surpluses of arms and destroy confiscated small arms where 
appropriate.58 Securing and destroying surplus arms helps prevent arms from 
being diverted to human rights abusers. 
At the regional and global level, the PoA focuses on fostering transparency 
and cooperation among states. Specifically, states ought to establish 
mechanisms at the regional level for fostering information-sharing and 
cooperation of law enforcement and custom control agencies.59 At the global 
level, the PoA tasks the secretary general, through the Department of 
Disarmament Affairs, with disseminating reports on implementation of the 
PoA provided voluntarily by states.60 The PoA also encourages states to aid the 
involvement of civil society and NGOs in the area of preventing illicit arms 
transfers.61 The significant drawback of the PoA is that it is a politically 
 
 51. Id. at ¶¶ 4–6. 
 52. Id. at ¶¶ 9–11. 
 53. Sean D. Murphy ed., UN Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 
901, 903 (2001). 
 54. See PoA, supra note 50, Part II, ¶¶ 2–23. 
 55. Id. at ¶ 2. 
 56. Id. at ¶ 5. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at ¶¶ 16–19. 
 59. Id. at ¶ 27. 
 60. PoA, supra note 50, at Part II, ¶ 33. 
 61. Id. at ¶ 40. 
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binding rather than legally binding document.62 States voluntarily report on 
their implementation of the PoA to the secretary general, but they are not 
required to do so. States recognize the important steps that the PoA has taken, 
however, and have included many of the PoA’s elements into the Treaty. 
C. Toward an Arms Trade Treaty 
The buildup to the Treaty relied heavily on individual actors and NGOs in 
the mid-1990s. In 1995, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Oscar Arias began a 
campaign to promote an establishment of an international arms trade 
agreement.63 Other Nobel Peace Prize laureates joined him in drafting the 
Nobel Peace Laureates International Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers in 
1997.64 The International Code of Conduct set forth ambitious human rights 
standards for regulating arms transfers,65 and encouraged further development 
of an international arms regime.66 In 2003, a group of NGOs created the 
Control Arms campaign to pursue a robust arms trade treaty and to lobby states 
to their cause.67 While Finland and the United Kingdom became early 
European supporters of a strong arms trade treaty in 2004, states in sub-
Saharan Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean showed the appeal of such a 
treaty beyond the boundaries of Western Europe.68 
In the summer of 2006, several states submitted a draft resolution titled 
“Toward an Arms Trade Treaty” to the First Committee of the UN General 
Assembly.69 This draft resolution drew strong support in the First Committee 
 
 62. Murphy ed., supra note 53, at 903. 
 63. PARKER, supra note 17, at 5. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Ernie Regehr, An International Code of Conduct for Arms Transfers, 18 PLOUGHSHARES 
MONITOR, no. 2, June 1997, available at http://ploughshares.ca/pl_publications/an-international-
code-of-conduct-on-arms-transfers/. Article 5, for example, prohibited transfer of arms to states 
that did not respected democratic rights, and Article 7 prohibited transfer if the receiving state did 
not participate in the Register of Conventional Arms. 
 66. Bromley et al., supra note 13, at 1039. The Code of Conduct developed into the 2001 
Framework Convention on International Arms Transfers. The goal of the framework was to 
codify already existing international law and provide a general treaty that states could amend with 
future protocols. This process would provide flexibility and universality. See Framework 
Convention on International Arms Transfers, n.i., http://www.seesac.org/sasp2/english/publica 
tions/2/4_1_Framework.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
 67. Amnesty International, Oxfam, and the International Action Network on Small Arms 
started Control Arms, and many other civil society groups and NGOs have joined Control Arms 
since 2003. See Bromley et al., supra note 13, at 1039; See also Member Organizations, 
CONTROL ARMS, http://www.controlarms.org/about-controlarms (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
 68. Bromley et al., supra note 13, at 1039. 
 69. Those states included Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, Kenya, and the United 
Kingdom. Id. at 1040. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2013] TIME TO RELOAD 235 
and then in the UN General Assembly at large.70 This original 2006 UN 
resolution called on states to submit their views on the feasibility, scope, and 
draft parameters of the treaty to the secretary general of the United Nations.71 
Over ninety states submitted their views to the secretary general, and these 
views have provided indications about the areas in which states agree and 
disagree.72 The 2006 resolution also called for establishing a group of 
governmental experts to examine those views and issue a report to the UN 
General Assembly.73 Finally, in 2009, the assembly agreed to a resolution for 
the scheduling of the preparatory committees in 2010 and 2011, and the actual 
Arms Trade Treaty Conference for July of 2012.74 
II.  FRAMEWORKS FOR ANALYZING TENSIONS BETWEEN STATES’ GOALS FOR 
THE ARMS TRADE TREATY 
The Treaty faces several obstacles from a collection of state interests. The 
frameworks that this section presents are ways of conceptualizing the different 
interests and opinions that groups of states have about the Treaty. Different 
groups of states have different goals for the Treaty.75 Moreover, these groups 
do not overlap perfectly.76 These frameworks illustrate the different interests 
that groups of states have expressed throughout the process of negotiating the 
Treaty. While not determinative of state action, the frameworks provide insight 
into the tensions that such a treaty creates between states. 
A. Analysis from the Perspective of State Interests 
One of the obstacles that the Treaty faces is the inclusion of human rights 
and humanitarian concerns as criteria for assessing arms transfers.77 A large 
group of states and many NGOs have pushed for a strong treaty that includes 
 
 70. G.A. Res. 61/89, supra note 7, ¶¶ 1–4. 
 71. Id. at ¶ 4. 
 72. SARAH PARKER, ANALYSIS OF STATES’ VIEWS ON AN ARMS TRADE TREATY 1 (2007), 
available at http://unidir.org/publications. 
 73. G.A. Res. 61/89, supra note 7, at ¶ 2. The group of governmental experts issued their 
report in 2008, and the General Assembly adopted the report that year. G.A. Res. 63/240, ¶ 1, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/240 (Dec. 24, 2008). 
 74. G. A. Res. 64/48, ¶¶ 4, 6, 8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/48 (Dec. 2, 2009). 
 75. See PARKER, supra note 72, at 6. 
 76. Bromley et al., supra note 13, at 1030 (explaining why the United States is difficult to 
categorize: at the July conference, the United States “remained an outlier in negotiations, 
adopting positions that were often at odds with many Western allies and progressive states but 
also supporting many of the elements of the ATT that were opposed by sceptical [sic] states.”); 
Id. at 1043 (categorizing states as either maximalist or skeptical and by Global North and South, 
and analyzing state preferences). 
 77. Id. at 1042. 
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those humanitarian considerations.78 Other interests exist as a possible 
framework for the treaty, however, and do not necessarily coincide with the 
humanitarian interests.79 These other interests include national security 
interests, state sovereignty interests, and economic interest. The frameworks 
differ in the obligations that the Treaty would place on the states.80 The 
humanitarian interest framework and other frameworks are not necessarily 
opposed to each other, however. A state might employ one framework for a 
particular issue, and a different framework for another issue.81 Moreover, two 
states within the same framework might disagree about a particular issue. 
States have a wide range of opinions about the potential provisions of the 
Treaty, and it is therefore impossible to lock a state into one particular 
framework. Based upon state responses during negotiations, however, it is 
possible to say what framework a state generally utilizes when assessing the 
issues embedded in the Treaty. This analysis will explain the underlying 
interest generally, and then describe how specific states emphasize those 
interests in negotiating the Treaty. 
1. Humanitarian Interests 
Humanitarian interests emphasize human security. The United Nations 
Development Programme introduced the concept of human security in 1994, 
and defined it as (1) “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and 
repression,” and (2) “. . . protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the 
patterns of daily life—whether in homes, in jobs, or in communities.”82 States 
and NGOs link the arms trade to human security because “conventional arms 
often assist in the perpetration of serious violations of human rights such as 
torture, the excessive use of force by security forces, extrajudicial executions, 
forced evictions and disappearances.”83 For these reasons, humanitarian 
interest supporters believe that it is necessary to have a strong and 
 
 78. Id. at 1041–42. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Humanitarian interests, for example, would create more restrictive requirements than 
sovereignty interests. 
 81. These two frameworks are not the only two frameworks that a state might use either. 
This article uses them because they are broad frameworks and well represented by states that are 
negotiating this treaty. 
 82. Roland Paris, Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?, 26 INT’L SEC. 87, 89 (Fall 
2001) (citing United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report, at 22 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1994)). 
 83. Clare da Silva, Creating a Human Rights Standard for the Arms Trade Treaty, in 
DISARMAMENT FORUM: IDEAS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY 27, 27 (U.N. Inst. for Disarmament 
Res., et. al eds., 2009), available at http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/ideas-for-peace-
and-security-en-323.pdf. 
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comprehensive treaty that would prevent violence and human rights abuses 
against civilian populations across the world.84 
2. State Sovereignty and National Security Interests 
While humanitarian interests focus on individuals, state sovereignty 
interests and national security interests focus on the state as a corporate body 
within the international arena.85 A state adhering to sovereignty interests tries 
to retain as much decision making power as possible and avoid limitations to 
that power.86 Because of its emphasis on maintaining independence, states that 
jealously guard their sovereignty have emphasized the need for making 
decisions for the Treaty by consensus.87 They have also resisted restrictive 
provisions that put significant burdens on their ability to import and export 
arms.88 States that rely on arms imports could be opposed to assessment 
criteria that required a transporting state to account for the importing state’s 
need for the arms.89 Attempts to assess the legitimate defense needs of an 
importing state “second-guess[es] a state’s assessment of its own security and 
defense needs, and intrudes on state sovereignty issues.”90 
National security interests focus on a state’s self defense capability and 
territorial integrity.91 States, however, also cite national security interests for 
 
 84. Ray Acheson, Editorial, Enhancing Human Security by Regulating the Arms Trade, 5 
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org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/att/monitor/ATTMonitor5.1.pdf. 
 85. See PAUL R. VIOTTI & MARK V. KAUPPI, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: 
REALISM, PLURALISM, GLOBALISM, AND BEYOND 56 (3rd ed. 1999) (discussing the Realist 
school of international politics). 
 86. Id. at 56–57, 68–69, 76–77. 
 87. See Statement by the Chinese Delegation at the Great Debate of United Nations 
Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, (July 2012) [hereinafter Statement of the Chinese 
Delegation], available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/statements/docs/20120709/2012 
0706_China_E.pdf (stating that the Treaty should not “be misused for political purposes to 
interfere with the normal arms trade and internal affairs of any state.”). 
 88. United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, July 2–27, 2012, Compilations of 
Views on the Elements of the Arms Trade Treaty, 38 A/CONF.217/2 (May 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/CONF.217/2&Lang=E. The views of 
Algeria, India, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela demonstrate this resistance to strong treaty 
provisions that may curb their arms imports. 
 89. PARKER, supra note 17, at 35. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Samuel M. Makinda, Sovereignty and International Security: Challenges for the United 
Nations, 2 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 149, 151–52 (1996). This is admittedly a simplistic view of 
state sovereignty. States face many constraints to their independence and decision-making, and 
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resist interference in their internal affairs. Id. at 165. 
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their international use of force.92 A national security interest framework might 
see a substantial benefit to an arms regulation treaty as a means of 
“prevent[ing] illicit transfers of [small arms and light weapons] and related 
ammunition to criminal gangs and armed groups operating on their national 
territory.”93 Criminal groups and terrorists within states undermine a state’s 
security.94 Thus, national security interests would most likely support a 
requirement that international arms transfers avoid diversion to such internal 
groups.95 The transparency that comes with reporting requirements could also 
fit within the national security interest framework. Transparency in arms 
transfers helps alleviate the dangers that could arise from arms accumulation.96 
Exporting states, meanwhile, may also rely on a state sovereignty 
framework to defend their interests. States that export arms do not want 
restrictions on their ability to transfer arms unless they freely consent.97 The 
Wassenaar Arrangement provides a model for arms regulation that adheres to a 
state sovereignty interest framework.98 The forty-one participants of the 
Wassenaar Arrangement are “primarily major producers of conventional arms 
and dual use items.”99 The Wassenaar Arrangement publishes guidelines for its 
members to utilize for assessing arms export decisions, sets the list of military 
goods and technologies covered, and “leaves to the judgment of individual 
 
 92. See id. at 161, 163 (suggesting that while the United Nations has been in the process of 
reinterpreting traditional notions of sovereignty, national security interests of the states on the UN 
Security Council influence those decisions. For example, the United States had a security 
interests in supporting UN intervention in Haiti in 1994 to depose a military dictatorship because 
of Haiti’s proximity to the United States and its allies). 
 93. Bromley et. al, supra note 13, at 1039. 
 94. Owen Green & Ariel Macaspac Penetrante, Arms, Private Militias and Fragile State 
Dynamics, in SMALL ARMS, CRIME AND CONFLICT: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE THREAT OF 
ARMED VIOLENCE 138, 139–42 (Owen Green & Nicholas Marsh eds., 2012) (describing how 
“fragile” states face destabilization from the illicit diversion of small arms and light weapons to 
non-state actors in their borders). 
 95. See PARKER, supra note 17, at 25–28. 
 96. Transparency might be a double-edged sword from the national security interest 
framework. National security information usually needs to be secret to be effective. However, a 
treaty that balances concerns for keeping some information private and reporting on physical 
capability might properly balance the interests involved. 
 97. Statement of the Russian Federation, Statement at the United Nations Conference on the 
Arms Trade Treaty, July 2–27, 2012, at 2, available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/ 
statements/docs/20120709/20120706_Russia_E.pdf (stating that states should individually 
determine their own national standards for arms transfers based on the highest common agreed 
upon standards). 
 98. Bromley et. al, supra note 13, at 1035. 
 99. Id. 
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states how to implement export controls.”100 The scope of the Wassenaar 
Arrangement is flexible and allows for changes to the list of covered items by 
consensus.101 It thus provides an exporting state discretion in arms transfers by 
only including items that all the states freely agree to report. 
States that rely on imports for their national defense are going to view any 
arms agreement largely through the lens of their national security interests. 
Importing interests may assert the inherent right of self-defense available to all 
states to justify the acquisition of particular arms.102 Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter enshrines the principle of self-defense, and thus gives an 
international legal basis to assert the right to obtain arms.103 States that do not 
have a strong domestic arms manufacturing industry, therefore, are going to be 
hesitant to agree to international restricts that may prevent them from acquiring 
arms. For example, Egypt stated at the July Conference that the Treaty should 
reflect the interest of importer states as well as exporter states.104 Specifically, 
Egypt noted that the Treaty needs to be assessed to prevent providing 
exporting states “added tools to further consolidate their practices in the 
context of existing export control regimes, often seen as discriminatory and 
highly politicized.”105 
3. Economic Interests 
Large exporting states have a strong economic incentive to maintain their 
level of arms trade. The arms industry is annually a $40 to $70 billion dollar 
industry.106 In negotiations of arms regulations, exporting states will want to 
protect their economic interests by ensuring the widest scope of legalized arms 
trade possible. Economic interests often combine with sovereignty interests for 
exporting states to create a strong prejudice against intrusive international 
regulations on arms transfers. Their ability to discriminate in arms transfers 
gives them the power to expand their influence and effectuate their interests 
abroad.107 Exporting states may resist restrictions on transfers to non-state 
 
 100. Aaron Fellmeth, The U.N. Arms Trade Treaty: Temporarily Holstered, INSIGHTS, Sept. 
20, 2010, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/30/un-arms-trade-treaty-tem 
porarily-holstered. 
 101. Id. 
 102. RUCHI ANAND, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 63 (2009). 
 103. Id. See also U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 104. Mootaz Ahmadein Khalil, Statement at United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade 
Treaty, ¶ 5 (July 2012) available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/statements/docs/20120 
705/Member%20States/20120705_Egypt_E.pdf. 
 105. Id. Egypt stated that it was particularly worried about exporting states “impos[ing] self 
proclaimed restrictions” on the basis of international humanitarian law to exert power over 
importing states. See id. 
 106. Fellmeth, supra note 100. 
 107. See Berry & Gladstone, supra note 1. 
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actors. While their real motivation is most likely sovereignty and economic 
interests, large exporting states also argue that they are trying to help those 
resisting an oppressive regime or trying to prevent genocide.108 
B. Negotiating the Parameters of the Arms Trade Treaty 
The Treaty would be a comprehensive regime with several components.109 
The most difficulty in negotiating the binding agreement, however, is 
determining the criteria and scope of the treaty. The states’ failure to conclude 
a treaty in July 2012 probably resulted from disagreements over the assessment 
criteria and scope of materials that the draft treaty included. These two areas 
will also provide the most opportunity for another breakdown of negotiations 
in March. 
1. Criteria of Assessment for Arms Transfers 
a. Human Rights 
While the humanitarian interest, sovereignty interest, national security 
interest, and economic interest frameworks could all recognize potential 
benefits of a global arms trading regime, they differ in the acceptable 
assessment criteria and scope of the treaty.110 States supporting humanitarian 
interests at the conference wanted to include a prohibition on transfers of arms 
when those arms present a substantial risk of violating human rights law.111 
The most frequently cited criterion in the state’s submissions to the secretary 
general was whether the transferred arms could be used to commit human 
rights violations.112 Of the ninety-six states that submitted views to the 
secretary general before the conference, sixty-two favored using “human 
rights” as a criterion for assessment of potential arms exports.113 Fifty-eight 
states listed international humanitarian law as a criterion.114 For the 
humanitarian interest states, human rights are the cornerstone of the treaty and 
 
 108. Denise Garcia, Arms Transfers Beyond the State-to-State Realm, 10 INT’L STUD. PERSP. 
151, 156–157 (2009). 
 109. See infra Part III. 
 110. Bromley et al., supra note 13, at 1041–42. 
 111. Mr. Thomas Mayr-Harting, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United 
Nations, European Union Opening Statement at the United Nations Conference on the Arms 
Trade Treaty, ¶ 7 (July 2, 2012) [hereinafter European Union Opening Statement], available at 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/statements/docs/20120705/Regional%20Groups/20120705 
_EU_E.pdf. 
 112. See PARKER, supra note 17, at 31; See also da Silva, supra note 83, at 27. 
 113. PARKER, supra note 72, at 9–10, Chart 3. While this is only about one third of the 
world’s nations, states that did not express human rights as a criterion to the secretary general 
may still support its inclusion in the treaty. 
 114. PARKER, supra note 17, at 30–31. Human rights and international humanitarian law 
made up the two most cited areas for creating criteria for the assessment of arms transfers. Id. 
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proper assessment criteria. For example, at the July Conference, Finland stated 
that “the most important criteria [for licensing] relate to human rights, 
international human rights law, and humanitarian law. These criteria must be 
binding.”115 Mechanisms exist for assessing the human rights records of 
states.116 A reliance on humanitarian interests would require states to utilize 
those mechanisms before making an arms import, export, or transport 
decision.117 If a destination were to fall below the human rights standard set 
within the guidelines, the state should not be able to grant an export license to 
that destination. The stronger the criteria that the Treaty codifies, the more 
difficult it will be for exporting states to justify arms transfers to suspected 
human rights abusers. 
This human rights criterion, however, met with resistance from states that 
emphasize the other interests. Russia, China, India, Egypt, the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization, and the League of Arab States at the conference 
all expressed disapproval at the emphasis on human rights.118 China, for 
example, asserted at the July Conference that all states have “sovereign rights 
to decide whether to give [a] green light or not to a certain arms trade 
transaction. [T]he criteria should. . .exclud[e] any political, controversial, or 
discriminatory elements.”119 Those importing states with poor human rights 
records also objected to the use of humanitarian interests to set the criteria for 
arms transfers because they had concerns about being targeted for sanctions 
from arms trades.120 Despite these dissenting views, humanitarian rights 
remain a core element of the treaty negotiations. The group of states committed 
to the humanitarian framework continued to push for a strong treaty that 
includes those humanitarian considerations well into the July conference.121 
 
 115. H.E. Erkki Tuomioja, Statement at the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade 
Treaty (July 2012), available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/statements/docs/20120705/ 
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violated human rights laws. 
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countries object to the application of humanitarian interest to arms export decisions as an 
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 119. Statement of the Chinese Delegation, supra note 87, at 3. 
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b. Socio-Economic Development and Gender Violence 
NGOs have also strongly supported requiring assessment of a recipient 
state’s economic development before permitting an arms transfer, even though 
only eight states suggested the criterion in their submissions to the secretary 
general in 2007.122 At the July Conference, NGOs continued to press states to 
consider including “provisions on poverty or socioeconomic development, 
gender-based armed violence, [and] armed violence in general.”123 States that 
firmly assert their sovereignty and economic interests, however, oppose 
assessing the economic decisions of recipient states as a criterion for arms 
transfers because such a requirement involves intruding on the recipient state’s 
ability to decide its own economic priorities.124 Brazil, for example, stated that 
they do “not favor the inclusion of criteria . . . that may associate a transfer 
with the impairment of efforts of poverty reduction or socio-economic 
development.”125 While the European Union did expressed support for 
including socio-economic development among the assessment criteria during 
the July conference,126 Canada, which usually aligns with humanitarian 
interests states, stated that including such criteria in the Treaty would be 
unworkable.127 Because a socio-economic development as an assessment 
criterion faces opposition even within the humanitarian interest framework, the 
negotiating states will probably not include it as a firm requirement in the 
treaty. 
c. Illicit Transfers, Diversion, and Non-State Actors 
Preventing diversion to criminal groups and illicit transfers, which serves 
both humanitarian and national security interests, provided a bridge between 
the states that support primarily those interests.128 Humanitarian interests want 
to ensure that legally traded arms are not diverted to groups who could commit 
human rights abuses. To this end, the Treaty should provide clear guidelines 
for states to follow when assessing the potential risk of diversion of arms 
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transfers.129 States that employ a national security framework to the Treaty also 
present concerns about diversion to terrorist and criminal groups.130 States 
widely agree that “accumulations and flows of [small arms and light weapons] 
present unacceptably high risks of obstructing post-conflict state-building and 
of driving fragile or conflict-prone states into a spiral of decline toward state 
collapse or war.”131 While states largely agree that diversion and illicit 
transfers should fall within the scope of the Treaty, they do not agree that the 
Treaty should prohibit transfers to all non-state actors. 
National security interests and state sovereignty interests do not necessarily 
overlap in the assessment of trade to non-state actors. Few states submitted the 
view that there should be a prohibition of arms sales to non-state actors in their 
statements to the secretary general.132 These particular arms transfers are 
controversial, and even states that utilize the same framework likely disagree 
about the level of restrictions that should be placed on them. National security 
interests would want to restrict and prohibit arms deals to non-state actors. 
India is a good example of a state employing the national security framework 
for the issue of transfers to non-state actors. India stated at the July 2012 
Conference that the Treaty should focus on combating terrorism by “making it 
obligatory for states not to authorize transfer of conventional arms to terrorists 
or non-state armed groups.”133 It then declares, however, that the treaty should 
not infringe on the legitimate right of states to purchase arms.134 By advocating 
the ability of states to obtain arms rather than non-state groups, India is trying 
to stabilize its own national security. 
State sovereignty and economic interests, on the other hand, support the 
ability to provide arms to non-state actors. The conduct of large exporting 
states suggests that they may oppose, or ignore, a ban on transfers to non-state 
actors if it suits their economic or sovereignty interests.135 The combination of 
economic benefit and sovereign decision-making interests often prompts a 
 
 129. See PARKER, supra note 17, at 26 (summarizing the view of the United Kingdom that 
clear guidelines are necessary to prevent confusion or inconsistent application by states in 
assessing potential arms transfers). 
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negative reaction to possible restrictions from exporting states.136 For example, 
“political support for the Palestinians explains the Arab and Iranian objections 
to the establishment of a new norm against prohibiting the transfer of arms to 
non-state actors.”137 
NGOs that support humanitarian interests monitor this behavior by arms 
exporting states and cite “irresponsible transfers” as further proof of the need 
for a strong treaty.138 However, the concept of controlling exports to 
“terrorists, rebel groups, and rogue states has legitimized selective 
discrimination according to the interests of suppliers rather than the impartial 
application of standards on human rights, corruption, and development.”139 
Because there is not a clear consensus about how to handle transfers to all non-
state actors, it will probably not be a big part of the treaty. 
2. Scope of the treaty 
The humanitarian interest framework generally wants to include the widest 
possible scope of items for inclusion in the Treaty. National security interests, 
sovereignty interests, and economic interests generally support a much 
narrower, well-defined scope for the treaty. There are categories of items, 
however, that split the groups of states that normally employ those interests. 
a. Conventional Weapons and Small Arms and Light Weapons 
There are several possible approaches for deciding the scope of the 
Treaty.140 Different approaches facilitate different goals. A general list that 
contains broad categories of arms, like the Register, would be easy to update 
with subsequent protocols.141 Such a generic list, however, invites ambiguity 
about whether the treaty covers a potential transfer item.142 A detailed list of 
items would help solve the ambiguity problem, but would be more difficult to 
negotiate because of the wide range of states’ opinions about including 
different classes of arms.143 States suggested several options for the scope of 
the Treaty at the July Conference. Generally, the states that adhered to state 
sovereignty interests, economic interests, and national security interests 
suggested using the seven categories of the Register and then adding small 
arms and light weapons.144 A portion of the states that adhere to humanitarian 
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interests also wanted to employ the Register framework, but wanted expanded 
categories for small arms and light weapons, ammunition, and parts and 
components.145 The other group of humanitarian interest states suggested a 
comprehensive and detailed list that included “all conventional arms, 
ammunition, munitions, other military equipment, internal security and riot 
control equipment, and technology included in the Wassenaar Arrangement’s 
Munitions List.”146 
While nearly all states agreed to include small arms and light weapons in 
the Treaty,147 there were disputes over whether the scope of the Treaty should 
comprehensively include conventional weapons such as combat vehicles, 
artillery, military aircraft, and missiles.148 This dispute over conventional 
weapons demonstrates the distance between the humanitarian interest 
framework and the framework premised on national security, state sovereignty, 
and economic interests. While China, Brazil, several North Africa countries, 
and much of the Middle East opposed including a wide range of conventional 
weapons in the treaty, the United States and European Union supported a more 
comprehensive list.149 Even among the states that support the humanitarian 
interest framework, disputes arose. Amnesty International, an active NGO, and 
several humanitarian interest states stated that private and sporting guns should 
be within the scope of the treaty.150 New Zealand, however, held the position 
that privately owned firearms and sporting rifles should not be within the scope 
of the treaty.151 Canada also wanted a clear statement in the treaty that affirmed 
the legality of hunting and sporting arms.152 Thus, in the March 2013 
Conference, the scope of the conventional arms covered by the treaty will 
continue to be a widely contested area. 
b. Ammunition 
The inclusion of ammunition also created disputes between the 
humanitarian interest states and the national security, state sovereignty, and 
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economic interest states. When the secretary general solicited states’ views on 
the Treaty, states cited ammunition most frequently for inclusion in the 
Treaty.153 Arguing that inclusion of ammunition served both humanitarian and 
national security concerns, states from Africa, Latin America, and the 
Caribbean considered the inclusion of ammunition “an essential element of an 
arms trade treaty to address domestic arms control problems.”154 Humanitarian 
interest states, such as Germany, strongly pushed for inclusion in the treaty.155 
Inclusion of ammunition, however, met with strong resistance from the United 
States and other exporting states. The United States called ammunition a 
“redline” and announced that “there will be no requirement for reporting on or 
marking and tracing of ammunition or explosives.”156 
The basis of the United States’ objection to the inclusion of ammunition is 
most likely based upon sovereignty and economic interests. Thomas 
Countryman, assistant secretary of the Bureau of International Security and 
Nonproliferation, stated in April 2012 that “the United States, which produces 
over seven billion rounds of ammunition a year, has resisted those efforts [to 
include ammunition in the Treaty] on the grounds that including ammunition is 
hugely impractical.”157 Ammunition is too “fungible and consumable” to be 
effectively accounted for and controlled consistent with the goals of the 
Treaty.158 Several NGOs, however, noted that the United States already 
conforms to the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List, which includes 
ammunition.159 Thus, the United States appears to be resisting further 
restrictions and responsibilities on their trade of ammunition. Because the 
United States is the largest arms exporter in the world,160 its support for the 
Treaty is crucial for the Treaty’s success. Therefore, the humanitarian interest 
states will probably try to accommodate it as much as possible while trying to 
adhere to their humanitarian goals. 
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c. Technology and Dual Use Goods 
Other items that are under consideration for inclusion in the Treaty are 
technology and dual-use goods. States supporting the human security 
framework want to ensure that the treaty covers both arms and the means for 
producing them.161 Australia, in its submission to the secretary general, pointed 
out the need “to ensure that emerging technologies can be covered as far as 
possible without requiring constant amendment of the treaty text.”162 Many 
states that adhere to the state sovereignty framework, however, oppose the 
inclusion of technology and dual-use goods in the treaty. Brazil explicitly 
stated that dual-use goods should not fall within the scope of the treaty in its 
submission to the secretary general.163 Moreover, several importing states with 
national security interests and exporting states with economic and sovereignty 
interests opposed broadening the scope of the treaty under the humanitarian 
interest framework because they “were concerned that the treaty would affect 
their ability to access technology to develop indigenous arms industries or [it 
would] restrict opportunities for arms exports.”164 Similar to the debate over 
ammunition, then, a small group of states with economic, national security, and 
state sovereignty interests exerted substantial influence over the July 2012 
negotiations by virtue of their extensive involvement in the arms market. 
III.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONCLUDING A SUCCESSFUL TREATY 
A. Analyzing the Arms Trade Treaty Draft 
Despite negotiating for nearly a month, states were not able to agree to the 
text of a treaty.165 On July 26, the president of the conference, Ambassador 
Moritan of Argentina, submitted a draft treaty but was unable to obtain final 
consensus for the text.166 The draft treaty provides a view of the work done to 
find consensus on the Treaty so far, and establishes a platform from which to 
start the March 2013 negotiations. 
The 2012 draft of Arms Trade Treaty relies heavily on the Register and 
PoA for its structure. The draft treaty tries to incorporate and enhance the 
reporting aspects of the Register by making those reports binding on States.167 
Meanwhile, the PoA’s emphasis on the humanitarian interest framework and 
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reliance on states’ cooperation continue to be themes in the draft treaty.168 Just 
as important as these structural arrangements, the draft treaty tries to balance 
the frameworks of the humanitarian, national security, state sovereignty, and 
economic interests. 
1. Criteria of Assessment 
The draft treaty largely incorporates this humanitarian interest framework 
as a way to obligate States to assess humanitarian concerns before approving 
an export of arms.169 Under Article 3, the draft treaty would prohibit States 
from transferring arms “if the transfer would violate its obligations under 
measures adopted by the United Nations Security Council” or that would 
violate a State’s international obligations or agreements.170 Article 3 also 
prohibits authorizing a transfer of arms “within the scope of this Treaty for the 
purpose of facilitating the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes constituting grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, or 
serious violations of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.”171 
Though the provisions do enshrine several elements of humanitarian 
international law, NGOs with humanitarian interests criticized Article 3 for not 
being strong enough.172 
Article 4 provides a crucial set of compromises in the draft treaty. Article 
4, paragraph 2 says that before a state can authorize an arms transfer, it must 
assess whether the export will: 
(a) be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international 
humanitarian law; 
(b) be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international human 
rights law; or 
(c) be used to commit or facilitate an act consisting of an offense under 
international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism to which the 
transferring State is a Party.173 
Moreover, Article 4, paragraph 6 states that when a state is considering 
exporting an item within the scope of the treaty, it “shall consider taking 
feasible measures . . . to avoid the arms: 
(a) being diverted to the illicit market or for unauthorized end use; 
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(b) being used to commit or facilitate gender-based violence or violence 
against children; 
(c) being used for transnational organized crime; 
(d) becoming subject to corrupt practices; or 
(e) adversely impacting the development of the importing State.”174 
These provisions establish the humanitarian interests as the core of the 
assessment criteria for all the arms that would fall within Article 2 of the 
treaty. The draft treaty did compromise the humanitarian interests, however, 
with the state sovereignty interests. The provisions in Article 4, paragraph 6, 
for example, are not subject to as high of standards as the provisions of Article 
4, paragraph 2. Article 4, paragraph 2 states that States “shall assess” the 
provisions of the paragraph, and under Article 4, paragraph 5, if “there is an 
overriding risk of any of the consequences under paragraph 2 of this article, the 
State Party shall not authorize the export.”175 Article 4, paragraph 6, by 
contrast, explains that states shall “consider taking feasible measures . . . to 
avoid” the provisions of the paragraph.176 Moreover, states that advocated their 
sovereignty interests, economic interests, and national security interests were 
able to include in the draft treaty a mitigation provision under Article 4, 
paragraph 4 to allow for more discretion in their arms transfer decisions.177 
2. Scope of the Draft Treaty 
The draft treaty modeled its scope after the Register. Article 2 of the draft 
treaty states that the treaty, at a minimum, “shall apply to all conventional arms 
within the following categories.”178 It lists the seven categories of the 
Register,179 but then also includes small arms and light weapons.180 By limiting 
its scope to the Register and small arms and light weapons, the draft treaty 
seems to be catering to the state sovereignty and national security interests. 
The draft treaty provides a very limited and general list of items for its scope, 
and excludes controversial categories such as technology and dual use items. 
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States and NGOs that adhere to the humanitarian interest decried the 
absence of ammunition from the scope of the draft treaty.181 The draft treaty 
did include ammunition and parts and components in Article 6 on export 
controls, but those items are not subject to the assessment requirements of 
Article 4, paragraph 6 within the draft treaty.182 Article 4, paragraph 6 
contained an extra measure for several human security objectives that states 
must apply to arms transfers and could have helped prevent illicit diversion of 
ammunition.183 The humanitarian interest states may argue that the “at a 
minimum” language provides the opportunity for expansion of the scope of the 
treaty through amendments. Amendments, however, must pass by consensus 
and not by some majority of states party to the treaty.184 Because amendments 
must be unanimous, states with state sovereignty and exporting interests retain 
flexibility to bar any new arms that they do not want restricted in the treaty. 
Due to the extensive compromises that the humanitarian interests made, 
despite being in the majority, the draft treaty’s assessment criteria and scope 
favor state sovereignty, economic, and national security interests.185 
3. National Implementation and Record Keeping 
Like the PoA, the draft treaty relies on national implementation to bring 
the provisions of the treaty into effect. Article 5, paragraph 3 of the draft treaty, 
for example, states that “each State Party shall take all appropriate legislative 
and administrative measures necessary to implement the provisions of this 
Treaty.”186 Like the PoA, the draft treaty has states “designate one or more 
national points of contact to exchange information on matters related to the 
implementation of the treaty.”187 Finally, the enforcement provision in Article 
11 would provide that “each State Party shall adopt appropriate national 
measures and policies as may be necessary to enforce national laws and 
regulations and implement the provisions of this Treaty.”188 These provisions 
place obligations on states to create administrative frameworks to properly 
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manage an arms regulation program. But because implementation of the 
treaty’s provisions is national, states that assert state sovereignty interest have 
discretion to create a regime that serves their interests but still complies with 
the Treaty. India, a state that adheres to state sovereignty, economic, and 
national security interest frameworks,189 stated at the July Conference that “the 
proposed treaty should respect differing constitutional, legal, and regulatory 
systems in various counties and should avoid being intrusive or prescriptive 
with respect to national policies or procedures.”190 The Treaty’s 
implementation and enforcement provisions seem to allow the amount of 
deference that states like India seek. 
The Register provides a point of comparison for Article 10 of the draft 
treaty, which covers Reporting and Record Keeping.191 Article 10 would 
require states to maintain national records of their export authorizations and 
actual exports of arms within the scope of the treaty.192 Under Article 10, 
paragraph 4, states must provide to the secretariat an initial report on the 
actions that state has taken to implement the treaty within the first year after 
entry into force.193 These two requirements will aid implementation of the 
treaty. Criticisms that previous international reporting mechanisms, such as the 
Register, failed to draw strong participation stemmed from the need for 
“effective systems of inter-agency communication” and a high level of 
capacity.194 With the draft treaty requiring the submission in Article 10, 
paragraphs 1 and 4, the international community can assess which States will 
need assistance to meet their reporting requirements early in the process. 
Article 10, paragraph 3 allows, but does not require, states to report to the 
secretariat “any actions taken to address the diversion of conventional arms to 
the illicit market or for unauthorized end use.”195 Article 10, paragraph 5 does 
require states to annually submit a report to the secretariat on their 
authorizations and actual transfers of arms that are under the scope of the draft 
treaty.196 The secretariat, however, will only submit the annual reports to the 
states party to the treaty, and states may omit commercially sensitive or 
national security information.197 The Netherlands, Japan, and Costa Rica stated 
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that the reports under Article 10, paragraphs 4 and 5 should be public.198 By 
only making the reports available to the states, the regime set up by the draft 
treaty nearly eliminates public transparency and the ability of a state’s citizens 
or NGOs to monitor compliance with the Treaty. Like the scope and transfer 
assessment criteria, then, the draft treaty made substantial compromises to state 
sovereignty, national security, and economic interests in the provisions of the 
more mechanical aspects of the treaty. 
B. Can The Arms Trade Treaty Work? 
The Treaty faces criticism from states and groups that claim that the treaty, 
even if implemented, will be ineffective.199 Currently there are arms 
embargoes against Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and 
these nations are still able to import arms due to noncompliant governments.200 
The Treaty faces criticism for not only being unable to stop states from 
overriding these embargoes, but also for potentially easing the path to some of 
the illicit transfers.201 These criticisms are particularly relevant after the draft 
treaty seemed to balance the interests strongly in favor of the state sovereignty, 
national security, and economic interests. NGOs expressed a fear that the draft 
treaty swung too far away from humanitarian interests in the attempt to secure 
more widespread support.202 However, the Treaty does take a useful approach 
toward creating a global arms regime. 
Harold Koh, professor at Yale Law School and former assistant secretary 
of state for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, suggested an approach to 
creating a global regulatory regime for arms.203 That approach involves the 
“transnational legal process,” in which “public and private actors. . .interact in 
a variety of public and private, domestic and international fora to make, 
interpret, enforce, and ultimately, internalize rules of international law.”204 The 
transnational legal process regarding global arms regulation entails five main 
stages.205 The first stage is knowledge of the global problem.206 Most states 
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acknowledge the problem of illicit arms transfers and support the Treaty 
movement.207 The second step in the process involves using networks of NGOs 
and civil society to build a regime to address the issue.208 There has been and 
continues to be active participation of NGOs and civil society involved in the 
drafting and monitoring of the Treaty process.209 The third is developing norms 
and finding committed individuals to promote those norms.210 Oscar Arias and 
the Nobel Peace Laureates drafting of the Nobel Peace Laureates International 
Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers in May 1997 provided a framework for 
discussing international arms regulations.211 The fourth is a “horizontal 
process” that occurs in the interaction between states’ governments.212 The 
Register and PoA have set global norms for reporting, transparency, and 
international cooperation, albeit imperfect ones.213 The fifth and final step of 
the process is the “vertical process” that occurs within the domestic law arena 
of an individual state.214 The Treaty provides the potential for the vertical 
process to occur by requiring states to pass domestic legislation to implement 
the treaty and comply with the reporting requirements.215 The transnational 
legal process, therefore, provides a model for improved prospects for the 
Treaty. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Arms Trade Treaty will continue to face barriers as it approaches 
March 2013 Conference. The July Conference left without a completed treaty 
but did substantial work to widen the Treaty’s appeal. The state sovereignty, 
national security, and economic interests of states have substantial protection 
in the draft treaty. Humanitarian interests still make up the core of the draft 
treaty, and if states comply with the provisions of the treaty as drafted, those 
humanitarian interests may sink into the domestic law regimes of the states. 
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V.  POST-SCRIPT 
The March 2013 Conference, like the July 2012 Conference, failed to 
produce consensus on the Arms Trade Treaty text.216 The UN General 
Assembly, however, agreed overwhelmingly upon the Treaty on April 2, 
2013.217 The Treaty that passed in the UN General Assembly in April 2013 
differs in some significant provisions from the draft treaty analyzed in this 
article.218 For example, the 2013 Treaty’s Article 3 and 4 bring ammunition 
and parts and components within the requirements of the Treaty. These 
differences between the July 2012 draft treaty and the 2013 full Arms Trade 
Treaty demonstrate the constraints that the consensus requirement put on the 
negotiating process. Because the July 2012 and March 2013 Conferences 
required consensus by all states, the states that opposed those provisions could 
prevent their inclusion. The need for consensus does not constrain the UN 
General Assembly, and so the stronger humanitarian principles that a majority 
of states supported could be included in the treaty. 
The failures of the July 2012 Conference and March 2013 Conference 
demonstrate the powerful effect that the interest frameworks had on the 
negotiating process. The 2012 draft treaty tried to balance the diverging 
interests of all states but could not obtain consensus. A majority of states 
supported the inclusion of humanitarian interest in the treaty, and so those 
provisions became key provisions in the April 2013 General Assembly 
resolution that adopted the Treaty. The Treaty still faces several hurdles to be 
effective. States that had pushed their national security and sovereignty interest 
still have considerable power in implementing the Treaty and ensuring its 
effectiveness. As norms develop, however, states will converge on good 
domestic and international practices to prevent the illicit trade in arms. 
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